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Cybercrime vs. Cyberwar: Paradigms for
Addressing Malicious Cyber Activity
Mieke Eoyang* & Chimène Keitner**
As we move toward a world of fully connected devices that share data on an
unprecedented scale (the “Internet of Things” or IoT), the cybercrime enforcement gap will pose an ever-greater threat to personal and national security.1 A variety of factors contribute to the relative vulnerability of the United States to
harm from malicious cyber activity (MCA).2 In 2018, then-DHS Secretary
Kirstjen Nielsen warned that “our digital lives are in danger like never before.”3
She identified the threat as coming from “hostile states, terrorists, and transnational criminals”—and, one might add, domestic terrorists and criminals.4 In the
face of these various threats, U.S. government responses to national security challenges in both the physical and virtual worlds have increasingly blurred the line
between transnational crime and armed conflict. This shift in narrative comes at a
cost. The displacement of law enforcement approaches by an armed conflict
model carries implications for institutional design, legal authorities, and resource
allocation. Notably, one result of a militarized approach to transnational cyber
threats has been to leave domestic law enforcement officers inadequately trained,
inadequately resourced, and inadequately supported to identify, deter, and punish
offenders.5 The urgent need for better resourced and better coordinated law
enforcement responses suggests a corresponding need to keep the essentially
criminal nature of most malicious cyber activity in focus, even as we grapple
with the implications of MCA that is conducted, sponsored, encouraged, or tacitly
permitted by nation-states.
This contribution aims to encourage greater self-awareness about the consequences
of viewing MCA predominantly through the lens of armed conflict, rather than law
* Then-Vice President for the Third Way National Security Program and Chairperson of the Cyber
Enforcement Initiative. This article was completed before her return to government service, and
represents her personal views, and not those of the US government, the Department of Defense, or
President Biden. © 2021, Mieke Eoyang and Chimène Keitner.
** Alfred & Hanna Fromm Professor of International and Comparative Law, UC Hastings Law.
1. See, e.g., Allison Peters & Amy Jordan, Countering the Cyber Enforcement Gap: Strengthening
Global Capacity in Cybercrime, 10 J. NAT’L. SECURITY L. & POL’Y 487 (2020).
2. See Jack Goldsmith & Stuart Russell, Strengths Become Vulnerabilities: How a Digital World
Disadvantages the United States in Its International Relations, AEGIS SERIES PAPER NO. 1806 (2018),
https://perma.cc/M8LJ-HQZM.
3. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SECRETARY KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN REMARKS: RETHINKING
HOMELAND SECURITY IN AN AGE OF DISRUPTION (Sept. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/DU2F-KXML.
4. See also FBI Director Christopher Wray, Statement Before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee (Oct. 10, 2018) (indicating that “[v]irtually every national and
criminal threat the FBI faces is cyber-based or technologically facilitated”), https://perma.cc/DNU6SUC5.
5. See, e.g., Nick Selby, Local Police Don’t Go After Most Cybercriminals. We Need Better
Training., WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/6P9G-4LL8; on the scale of the
problem, see e.g., JONATHAN LUSTHAUS, INDUSTRY OF ANONYMITY: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF
CYBERCRIME (2018).
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enforcement. The tension between competing paradigms for addressing criminal activity that rises to the level of a national security threat is familiar from—and can
trace its roots to—the U.S. response to the attacks of 9/11. Rather than deal with
transnational terrorism primarily as a law enforcement matter, the United States opted
for a military response, invading Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In the wake
of 9/11, the U.S. government adopted the term “Global War on Terror” or GWOT
and began viewing measures taken against terrorist groups and nation-states that harbor or support them through an armed conflict, rather than a law enforcement, lens.
Many policy decisions previously addressed through civilian authorities and processes were revisited under new national security authorizations as part of this global
“war.” For example, the decision to prosecute “enemy combatants” using military
commissions rather than Article III courts exemplifies the view that the United States
was, and is, engaged in a “war” on terror. Early justifications for the Bush administration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program, later revealed as “Stellar Wind,” rested on the
President’s national security powers, and ignored existing civil and law enforcement
authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).6 This
militarized paradigm has become embedded in our vocabulary, and it has informed
the allocation of authority and resources in efforts to protect the United States from
terrorist threats.
This contribution seeks to identify and assess the frameworks used to describe
and deter malicious cyber activity, and to highlight legal and operational challenges in tackling problems that arise where these frameworks overlap or intersect.
To that end, we examine two different models, an “armed conflict model” and a
“law enforcement model,” that have been used to address the threat posed by such
activity. The terms cyberwar and cybercrime, respectively, encapsulate each of
these models—yet the line separating these categories is not well defined, and
both terms have been used by laypersons and experts alike to describe conduct
ranging from network intrusions to data exfiltration to denials-of-service. Our
analysis of these ambiguities and their implications proceeds in four parts. Part I
canvasses recent U.S. government approaches to combating MCA. Part II explores
the assumptions underlying the predominant armed conflict model. Part III discusses the implications of characterizing MCA as cyberwar as opposed to cybercrime. Part IV concludes by suggesting that these characterizations should be
viewed along a continuum, and that the law enforcement model should not be
given short shrift by policy makers or—perhaps most importantly—appropriators.
I. U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO CYBER THREATS
As the United States began grappling seriously with cybersecurity and malicious cyber activity, it did so within a militarized lens. In 2009, the Secretary of
Defense directed the establishment of Cyber Command within the Department of

6. See U.S. DEP’T JUST., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., OVERSIGHT & REV. DIV., REPORT NO. 2009-0013AS, REV. DEP’T JUST.’S INVOLVEMENT WITH PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (U) (2009), https://
perma.cc/P7H9-384M.
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Defense.7 That same year, an international group of experts began deliberations
on what became known as the Tallinn Manual, an attempt to detail the applicability of international law principles to cyber conflict.8 A second Tallinn Manual 2.0
elucidated international legal principles applicable to peacetime cyber operations.9 Unfortunately, experts were unable to agree on how to define the dividing
line between cyber operations that amount to armed attacks and those that fall
short of this level, which might also help differentiate between situations that
warrant an armed conflict approach and those that should be treated as law
enforcement matters.10
The lack of clarity about what amounts to an armed attack in cyberspace also
makes it difficult to disentangle and de-conflict militarized and civilian
approaches to malicious cyber activity. Within a cyberwar frame, the Department
of Defense has inaugurated a policy of “defend[ing] forward” to “disrupt or halt
malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level
of armed conflict.”11 On the law enforcement side, the Department of Justice has
pursued a cybercrime strategy of “attribution by indictment” to identify, deter,
and punish malicious cyber actors who target the private sector, even when they
do so on behalf of nation-states.12 Although, as explored below, some nationstate-sponsored cyber activity challenges the idea that we can always draw a clear
distinction between transnational cybercrime and malicious activity just below
the armed attack threshold, privileging a war (or potential war) model over a
crime model carries substantial implications for the domestic allocation of resources and authority, and for the prospects of international cooperation to deter
would-be cyber criminals and enforce prohibitions on MCA.13
We readily acknowledge that placing greater emphasis on the law enforcement
paradigm is not a panacea. Notably—perhaps more so than any other previous

7. SEC. OF DEF., ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBORDINATE UNIFIED U.S. CYBER COMMAND UNDER U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND FOR MILITARY CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS (2009), https://perma.cc/G37D-YXVB.
8. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N.
Schmitt, ed. 2013).
9. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS
(Michael N. Schmitt, ed. 2017).
10. See Michael N. Schmitt, Peacetime Cyber Responses and Wartime Cyber Operations Under
International Law: An Analytical Vade Mecum, 8 HARV. NAT. SEC. J. 239, 245 (2017) (indicating that
“[a]lthough the International Group of Experts agreed that cyber operations resulting in physical damage
or injury are unambiguously uses of force, no consensus could be reached as to when cyber operations
not having those consequences qualify”).
11. U.S. DEP’T DEF., SUMMARY: DEP’T DEF. CYBER STRATEGY 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/JK94-SMT4.
12. See Chimène I. Keitner, Attribution by Indictment, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 207 (2019) (identifying
and analyzing the novel practice of publicly linking MCA to foreign states by announcing and releasing
detailed indictments against foreign actors for violating U.S. criminal law); see also Garrett Hinck &
Tim Maurer, Persistent Enforcement: Criminal Charges as a Response to Nation-State Malicious Cyber
Activity, 10 J. NAT. SECURITY L. & POL’Y 525 (2020) (further exploring this practice).
13. These implications were highlighted by President Obama’s use of the term “cyber-vandalism” to
characterize North Korea’s hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment. For criticism of this approach, see,
e.g., David Rothkopf, Obama Is Wrong: The Sony Hack Is Not “Cybervandalism”, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Dec. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/ZLF9-MU6M.
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form of criminality—cyber criminality almost invariably involves actions
(whether human or machine) across multiple territorial jurisdictions, potentially
implicating multiple different domestic legal systems, and even different definitions of what constitutes criminal behavior. Even under a law enforcement model,
the degree of international cooperation required to apprehend and punish cyber
criminals has, to date, proved to be a major obstacle to creating effective deterrence, even when the authors of MCA can be identified and their involvement
proven with a sufficient degree of certainty based on admissible evidence.14
Moreover, the potential involvement of nation-state actors means that the foreign
policy consequences of law enforcement decisions need to be assessed on a regular basis.15 In addition, in certain circumstances and with respect to certain actors,
an armed conflict model might be more appropriate.16 The need for flexibility and
coordination requires an institutional structure that can oversee, direct, and deconflict enforcement initiatives.17
With this backdrop in mind, this contribution aims to provoke deeper thinking
about the relationship between the armed conflict model and the law enforcement
model in addressing pervasive, costly, and disruptive MCA engaged in by a range
of actors.18 In particular, it seeks to focus attention on a neglected aspect of contemporary approaches to deterring and punishing MCA, as illustrated in the diagram below. Just as there are both machine-based and human-based defensive
responses to MCA, so too are there machine-based and human-based offensive
responses. In our view, human-based offensive responses have been insufficiently
resourced and developed.

14. See, e.g., Mike Eckel, For Russia and U.S., Uneasy Cooperation on Cybercrime Is Now a Mess,
RADIO FREE EUR/RADIO LIBERTY (Apr. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/529D-C8XW; Ron Cheng,
Prospects for U.S.-China Cybercrime Cooperation: The Road Thus Far, LAWFARE (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://perma.cc/9KZV-EPW6.
15. It is curious in this regard that there was no apparent State Department representation in the bipartisan Cyberspace Solarium Commission formed to study these issues. See Sen. Angus King & Rep.
Mike Gallagher, Announcing the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, LAWFARE (Aug. 19, 2019, 3:13
PM), https://perma.cc/RGZ3-KS5G.
16. There is also a connection between state-sponsored and state-executed cybercrime and a state’s
ability to conduct armed attacks. See, e.g., Sébastien Seibt, How Cybercrime Funds North Korea’s
Nuclear Programme, FRANCE24 (Aug. 8, 2019, 15:14), https://perma.cc/7CQ7-TVE9.
17. Although this institutional framework could take various forms, it did not escape notice that the
White House eliminated the position of cybersecurity coordinator on the National Security Council in
May 2018. See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, White House Eliminates Cybersecurity Coordinator
Role, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/4TBR-XGFR.
18. We have, for the purposes of this paper omitted, analysis of cyber attacks under other legal
frameworks designed to regulate spaces outside of designated sovereignty of a particular nation-state
such as treaties relating to outer space law, the moon, and Antarctica. Those domains, unlike cyber, are
not easily accessed or regularly used by civilian actors. Further, we have not analyzed responses to
MCA under two other legal frameworks designed to regulate international commons: those governing
the use of international airspace and the law of the sea. Analyses that draw on these paradigms generally
focus on how to prescribe rules for cyberspace, whereas we are concerned primarily with how to enforce
prohibitions on criminal activity that already exist under various countries’ domestic laws.
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Fig. 1
Typology of Responses to MCA
Defensive

Offensive

Machine

Network security (technical)

“Defending forward”; network-to-

Human

Cybersecurity (behavioral)

network; persistent engagement
Criminal law responses;
government-to-individual

Defensive capabilities at the “machine” level must continue to be developed
and implemented, just as offensive machine capabilities—used appropriately—
can play an important role in U.S. cyber strategy. Likewise, it is essential to cultivate defensive human capabilities through education and outreach (and, if necessary, incentives such as liability schemes). At the present time, however, our
human offensive capabilities in the form of local, state, and federal law enforcement responses remain severely neglected. There are good reasons to make the
development of such capabilities a priority.
We recognize that some of the above categories can more accurately be placed
along a continuum, rather than in discrete boxes. Similarly, intelligence and counterintelligence activities occupy an amorphous space between the traditional categories
of war and crime. Appropriate responses to MCA cannot be identified solely on the
identity of the perpetrator (e.g., nation-state vs. private actor) or the aim of the conduct (e.g., geopolitical vs. financial gain). Nation-state-sponsored activity can be
directed towards both public and private sector activities (which can themselves be
difficult to disentangle), and both state and non-state actors can have motives ranging
from economic gain to geopolitical disruption (or both).19
In the absence of a comprehensive international legal framework governing
MCA, most deterrence and enforcement activities remain rooted in domestic law,
including domestic criminal law.20 Importantly, as senior DHS officials have
noted, “the vast majority of cyberspace is civilian space.”21 One might think these
factors would contribute to a widespread understanding of MCA as
19. Jason Healey’s work has been particularly helpful in thinking about the continuum along which
nation-states conduct, support, and interdict MCA. See JASON HEALEY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, BEYOND
ATTRIBUTION: SEEKING NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CYBER ATTACKS (Feb. 22, 2012), https://perma.
cc/2BJN-GN5K.
20. That said, it is worth noting that sixty-three countries, including the United States, have ratified
the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, ETS No.
185. In addition, at the time of writing, two groups were being formed under UN auspices to continue
the arduous process of elaborating norms of “responsible State behavior” in cyberspace: a sixth UN
Group of Governmental Experts (to start in 2019 and report to the UN General Assembly in 2021 under
the terms of its founding resolution, https://perma.cc/P6YB-3JBK, and a new open-ended group (to start
in 2019, and report to the UN General Assembly in 2020 under the terms of its founding resolution,
https://perma.cc/UEE6-JCGD).
21. Jane Holl Lute & Bruce McConnell, Op-Ed: A Civil Perspective on Cybersecurity, WIRED (Feb.
11, 2011, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/K297-8MY8.
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predominantly a challenge for transnational law enforcement, analogous to combating other forms of transnational organized crime. Nonetheless, the terms commonly used to describe MCA come almost uniformly from a military lexicon.
The pervasive use of these terms tends to reinforce the predominance of an armed
conflict model for deterring, and defending against, non-militarized forms of
MCA.22
Invoking a war frame may lead policymakers to undervalue malicious cyber
activity aimed at civilian targets for financial gain. The FBI estimates that these
forms of MCA—comprising internet-enabled theft, fraud, and exploitation—
caused at least $2.7 billion in financial losses in 2018.23 The Center for Strategic
and International Studies assessed in 2018 that “cybercrime may now cost the
world almost $600 billion, or 0.8% of global GDP.”24 In light of these trends, a
more balanced approach to the problem of digital insecurity would place “more
emphasis on law enforcement and diplomacy to prevent an overreliance on the
military,” which is ill-suited to addressing the full range of MCA engaged in by
both state and non-state actors, as described further below.25
II. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE ARMED CONFLICT MODEL
Unauthorized cyber intrusions of all types are referred to colloquially as
“cyberattacks.” Although experts have parsed the threshold at which MCA
amounts to an “attack” for the purposes of international humanitarian law,26 the
terms “cyberattack” and “cyberwar” have become short-hand in discussing all
forms of MCA, without distinction. As a threshold matter, the Department of
Defense views “cyberspace” as a war-fighting domain, along with air, land, sea,
and space.27 Within these domains, armed conflicts can take the form of international armed conflicts between nation-states (IACs), on the one hand, or noninternational armed conflicts between governmental forces and non-state armed

22. Additional unintended consequences might include the exclusion of certain business losses from
cyber insurance coverage. See, e.g., Adam Satariano & Nicole Perlroth, Big Companies Thought
Insurance Covered a Cyberattack. They May Be Wrong., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/
SNV8-BGNY (describing insurance companies’ refusal to pay claims for business losses associated
with the NotPetya virus on the grounds that they fell under the “war exclusion”).
23. FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 2018 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 5 (2018), https://perma.cc/G3RUVUPT.
24. CSIS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CYBERCRIME—NO SLOWING DOWN (Feb. 2018), https://perma.cc/
H7A4-Y9GX.
25. See Mieke Eoyang, Allison Peters, Ishan Mehta & Brandon Gaskew, To Catch a Hacker: Toward
a Comprehensive Strategy to Identify, Pursue, and Punish Malicious Cyber Actors, THIRD WAY 2 (Oct.
29, 2018) https://perma.cc/3HN9-52WB.
26. See, e.g., Paul A. Walker, Rethinking Computer Network “Attack”: Implications for Law and
U.S. Doctrine, 1 NAT. SEC. L. BR. 33, 33 (2011); see also Kyle Genaro Phillips, Unpacking Cyberwar:
The Sufficiency of the Law of Armed Conflict in the Cyber Domain, 70 JOINT FORCE Q. 70, 72 (2013)
(putting forth a diagram derived from Walker’s analysis).
27. DEP’T DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3 (2018); but cf. Martin C. Libicki, Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting Domain, 8 I/S: A J. OF L.
& POL’Y 321 (2012) (identifying “conceptual errors that may arise by thinking of cyberspace as a
warfighting domain analogous to the traditional warfighting domains”).
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groups within the boundaries of a single state (NIACs), on the other. More
recently, “transnational” or “global” NIACs have challenged the dividing line
between these categories.28
The contemporary idea that nation-states maintain a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force within their respective territories, and that they are willing and able to
control malicious activity emanating from their territories, breaks down when
there are relatively few barriers to entry for engaging in that activity. This is particularly true when it comes to MCA. However, in discussing MCA within a war
frame, a series of inferences are often made that lead analysts to posit that the deterrence frames from the armed conflict context can be applied directly to cybersecurity. Cyberwar, like “cyberspace,” is “an influential and charismatic metaphor”
which shapes the way that many scholars approach their analysis.29 Indeed,
throughout both the popular and academic literature, malicious cyber acts are frequently discussed in a war frame—whether those acts are performed to disrupt
services, gather information, steal or extort money, or influence human behavior.30
In the academic literature, adopting the war frame leads to analysis of cyber activity within existing paradigms designed to avert conflict, such as deterrence via
threat of retaliation. This, in turn, can lead to concerns about escalation.
As James Miller and Neal Pollard have emphasized, “deterrence strategy
should seek to influence a competitor’s decision-making by denying it the gains

28. For literature on the challenges involved in classifying armed conflicts, see, for example, David
E. Graham, Defining Non-International Armed Conflict: A Historically Difficult Task, 88 INT’L L. STUD.
43, 50–52 (2012) (noting that the U.S. rarely “officially” determines when a conflict has crossed the
threshold between international and non-international conflict, and that it views the “basic provisions of
the law of armed conflict” as applying to both categories as a policy matter of policy); Dapo Akande,
Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in ELIZABETH WILMSHURST (ed.),
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, ch. 3 (2012) (examining the history and
consequences of distinguishing between international and non-international armed conflicts); Andreas
Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War and the Notion of Armed Conflict: A Tentative
Conceptualization, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 95 (2009) (emphasizing the need for objective
criteria to determine when international humanitarian law applies in a given conflict).
29. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS
WORLD 16 (2008).
30. Titles invoking the armed conflict model include: JOHN P. CARLIN, DAWN OF THE CODE WAR:
AMERICA’S BATTLE AGAINST RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE RISING GLOBAL CYBER THREAT (2018); DAVID
E. SANGER, THE PERFECT WEAPON: WAR, SABOTAGE, AND FEAR IN THE CYBER AGE (2018); P.W.
SINGER & EMERSON T. BROOKING, LIKEWAR: THE WEAPONIZATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2018); FRED
KAPLAN, DARK TERRITORY: THE SECRET HISTORY OF CYBERWAR (reprint edn., 2017); RICHARD A.
CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBERWAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT (2012). Titles that distinguish “cybercrime” from “cyberwarfare” include: JONATHAN
LUSTHAUS, INDUSTRY OF ANONYMITY: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF CYBERCRIME (2018); RICHARD A.
WHITE, CYBERCRIME: THE MADNESS BEHIND THE METHODS (2018); IGOR BERNIK, CYBERCRIME AND
CYBERWARFARE (2014); P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2014); BRIAN KREBS, SPAM NATION: THE INSIDE STORY OF ORGANIZED
CYBERCRIME—FROM GLOBAL EPIDEMIC TO YOUR FRONT DOOR (2014). Titles that fall in-between
include: MARC GOODMAN, FUTURE CRIMES: INSIDE THE DIGITAL UNDERGROUND AND THE BATTLE FOR
OUR CONNECTED WORLD (reprint edn. 2016).
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of its actions, irrespective of any retaliation or escalation.”31 As Jason Healey
puts it, “[t]he debate on cyber conflict has gotten so locked into deterrence, escalation, coercion, and signaling we pundits often forget that conflict is sometimes
straightforward and you just have to stop adversaries from punching you.”32 This
insight has relevance in both the armed conflict and law enforcement paradigms,
as illustrated by Israel’s Iron Dome program.33 Even traditional deterrence theory
would acknowledge the important role of “deterrence through denial,” in addition
to “deterrence through punishment.” In the words of Andrew Krepinevich, Jr.,
“[s]ince World War II, U.S. defense strategy has relied on communicating to
rivals that any aggression would either fail or provoke a devastating counterattack—deterrence in a nutshell.”34 That said, the problems with excessive reliance
on this model in the cyber context (not to mention post-Cold War international
relations more generally) include the relatively low cost of attacking compared to
the high cost of defending; problems of attribution (leading to delayed responses
and the risk of being deceived by “false flag” operations); and the multiplicity of
adversaries with varying degrees of connection to, and control by, foreign
states.35
As many critics have noted, however, despite the pervasiveness of the war
frame as a metaphor, malicious cyber acts do not fit neatly within it. As Thomas
Rid wrote in Cyber War Will Not Take Place, the traditional Clauswitzian definition of war has not been met in the malicious cyber acts often offered as examples

31. James N. Miller & Neal A. Pollard, Persistent Engagement, Agreed Competition and Deterrence
in Cyberspace, LAWFARE (Apr. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/DE5Q-V6LH.
32. Jason Healey, Taking Down Russian Trolls is My Kind of Cyberattack, CIPHER BRIEF (Feb. 28,
2019, 9:12 AM), https://perma.cc/5EA6-RM93. To this end, Michèle Flournoy and Michael Sulmeyer
have proposed creating “a new cyberdefense agency whose purpose would be not to share information
or build criminal cases but to help agencies, companies, and communities prevent attacks.” Michèle
Flournoy & Michael Sulmeyer, Battlefield Internet: A Plan for Securing Cyberspace, FOREIGN AFF.
(Sept./Oct. 2018), https://perma.cc/9XFX-N63X.
33. See, e.g., Jacob Nagel & Jonathan Schanzer, Assessing Israel’s Iron Dome Missile Defense
System, FOUND. FOR DEF. DEMOCRACIES (Nov. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/D55W-R3DS (discussing
advantages and drawbacks of the system).
34. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Eroding Balance of Terror: The Decline of Deterrence, FOREIGN
AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://perma.cc/G8K9-HY3V; see also Jonathan Solomon, Cyberdeterrence
between Nation-States: Plausible Strategy or a Pipe Dream?, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Spring 2011, 1-25
(assessing challenges for punitive cyberdeterrence and concluding that “cyberdeterrence by denial may
actually be the stronger and more credible strategic path for the United States”).
35. To be fair, these problems are not entirely unique to the cyber “domain.” As Dorothy Denning
observes with respect to land, sea, air, space, and cyber: “all are domains of human practice,
characterized by a wide range of activity by both state and nonstate actors, some of which is hard to
attribute, and by a variety of weapons ranging in availability, cost, and effects produced.” Dorothy E.
Denning, Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence, 77 JOINT FORCE Q. 8, 15 (April 2015).
Additional complications arise from lack of clarity surrounding the international standards—legal or
otherwise—governing the conduct of certain cyber activities that fall below the “use of force” threshold.
See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4),
36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations in International Law: The Use of
Force, Collective Security, Self-Defense, and Armed Conflicts, in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON
DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 151
(2010).
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of cyber attacks that amount to acts of war.36 He lays out three criteria that, if
present, would identify a cyber act as an act of war. First, war is an act of force to
compel the enemy to do one’s will. Second, war is instrumental and violence is
the means for the attacker to achieve its ends. Finally, an act of war is always political in nature. Even to analyze MCAs through this frame, one must make certain assumptions about the nature of the actors and the environment in which they
operate. Popular writers and even academic analysts view MCAs under the cyberwar frame, without examining whether these basic assumptions apply.
At their core, the laws of armed conflict developed to constrain the behavior of
nation-states. As such, the framework assumes some basic characteristics of a
given conflict, including (1) territoriality; (2) sovereignty; and, relatedly (3) the
state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Yet, when applied to the experience of institutions confronting MCAs, these assumptions do not describe the
environment in which malicious actions and responses occur.
(1) Territoriality. Deeply embedded in the international order is the idea of
territoriality and control over physical space.37 Historically, international armed
conflicts often arose over contested territory.38 The principle of territorial integrity enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter establishes the sanctity of territory as a cornerstone of peace. However, MCAs challenge the
centrality of territory. The internet is everywhere and nowhere at the same time.
The physical layer has locality, with wires and cables flowing across physical territory, and servers and terminals located within specific jurisdictions, but actions
and their effects are not necessarily determined or limited by those locations.39
Due to the migration to cloud computing and platform-based access, MCAs can
be viewed as occurring wherever the actor is located (which can be spoofed to an
alternate location), or wherever the victim experiences the consequences. As
some have noted, data have no intrinsic territoriality.40
A cyberattack dreamed up in St. Petersburg and executed in Macedonia across
servers located in Poland or Ireland, against an office in Washington, D.C. but

36. THOMAS RID, CYBER WAR WILL NOT TAKE PLACE 1–4 (2013).
37. Dominic D.P. Johnson & Monica Duffy Toft, Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial
Conflict, 38 INT’L SEC. 7 (2013).
38. Id.
39. Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L. J. 317, 322-25 (2015).
40. Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326 (2015). It is easy to become
tied up in knots thinking about jurisdiction in cyberspace. That said, at a basic level, MCA involves (1)
one or more human beings (2) giving instructions via computers to (3) produce a result, whether that
result involves purely digital effects (e.g., stealing bitcoin) or changes the behavior of another human
being (e.g., by eliciting a response to a fraudulent request). Results that involve changing human
behavior are sometimes referred to as “cyber-enabled” or “internet-enabled” crime. See, e.g., Neil
Desai, Tackling Cyber-enabled Crime Will Require Public-Private Leadership, https://perma.cc/
WX9B-END3 (visited Jan. 18, 2021). Regardless of the label, there are one or more perpetrators, and
one or more direct or indirect victims. Both perpetrator(s) and victim(s) are subject to the laws of one or
more nation-states based on ties of nationality and/or territory. In the absence of an international judicial
system, attaching legal consequences to conduct that violates those laws falls to the domestic authorities
of one or more of those states.
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accessed remotely in Cancun poses serious challenges to a territorially-based
conception of jurisdiction, let alone armed conflict. It is theoretically possible for
nation-states to categorize and respond to MCA based on the location of the
attack’s origin and its effects. However, the originating territory is not always
clear and often can’t be identified quickly, thus undermining traditional deterrence models that depend upon swift and accurate responses.
(2) Sovereignty. Underlying the traditional model of international armed conflict is the principle of Westphalian sovereignty—the idea that states can control
what happens domestically while adhering to principles of non-intervention
across international borders. But the borderless, ubiquitous nature of the internet
means that in this space notions of Westphalian sovereignty do not readily apply.
While states may have the notional ability to regulate actions originating in their
territory through application of local laws and regulations, most governments currently have little ability to prevent impacts within their territory of actions taken
elsewhere through cyberspace.
Further, because the infrastructure of the internet was largely created and is
currently maintained by private sector actors, the ability of states to control crossborder data flows is largely hindered by a lack of control over both the mechanisms and the content of the internet. In particular, where technology and internet
companies provide multinational platforms, individual users may take actions
that are prohibited within an impacted country but are legal where the user is
located. For example, a comedy show taped in Manhattan, New York and
uploaded by a company in Los Gatos, California can reach a global audience,
some of whom may find that the content violates local speech laws.41 Because
states have much less of a monopoly on cyber infrastructure and activity than
they do on weapons and their use, the ability of a state to maintain domestic control of cyber activity relies on cooperation from civilian commercial entities.
(3) State monopoly on legitimate use of force. The biggest challenge to viewing MCAs through a cyberwar lens is that the laws governing the resort to armed
force traditionally assume that states have a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force. Historically, part of the definition of being a state is the ability to control
force emanating from within one’s territory. Command and control, organization
into armies, and use of uniforms all signal that a state, not an individual, has
authorized the actions being taken.
This does not mean that all uses of military force are actually controlled by the
state, but states traditionally had sufficient control to serve as effective international gatekeepers. Classical theories of deterrence, including in the nuclear
arena, have developed on the theory that it is the sovereign ruler—whether an
elected leader or a dictator—who is in control of either initiating or responding to
the use of force. Military planners could generally rely on certain assumptions
about the cause-and-effect relationship between their strategies and the desired

41. Jim Rutenberg, Netflix Bow to Saudi Censors Comes at a Cost to Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
6, 2019), https://perma.cc/8ATD-YRWH.
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outcomes. But in the cyber domain, many of the MCAs that occur are conducted
not by states but by private actors looking for gain, stealing information, or even
just demonstrating proof of concept. From the perspective of the victimized entity, the effect may be clear, but the motive may not be. Indeed, there is a spectrum of state involvement in the cyber domain, from unsanctioned criminals,
through “patriotic hackers,” all the way up to national armies.42 Each of these
groups might be susceptible (or not) to different types of coercive responses, just
as the states hosting such groups (either deliberately or inadvertently) might be
amenable (or not) to direct responses by affected states. The situation is complicated even further by the current lack of a clear, shared understanding about the
types of cyber activities that are, and are not, prohibited on a global scale, even
though many countries have at least codified restrictions on criminal uses of the
internet in their domestic laws.
Further, when it comes to online malicious acts, the state does not have the
same degree of monopoly on the use of force that it does with either conventional
or nuclear weapons. First, the development and use of so-called “cyber weapons”
and the execution of code are not limited to government weapons designers. The
code through which exploits are used are designed and built by private, commercial engineers outside of the defense contracting context. There is now a robust
private sector market for the same kinds of offensive tools used by governments,
which can now be used to target private companies and individuals. Criminals on
the darkweb trade in tools designed to exfiltrate data, interrupt services, and build
ransomware attacks. Even when states design, build, and stockpile cyberweapons, they cannot guarantee exclusive control of their tools.43 States are unwilling
to engage in the same kinds of transparency and verification regimes of their
cyber-tools to demonstrate their exclusive control. In the absence of a state
monopoly on the use of force, the idea of state-to-state deterrence as an effective
solution to curbing cyber conflict is unlikely to yield a cessation of hostile
activity.
In sum, discussions of “cyberwar” tend to over-emphasize military responses
as well as the development of rules of conduct analogous to the rules of armed
conflict. This can crowd out thinking about MCA through other frames and developing other institutional responses.
III. CYBERWAR VS. CYBERCRIME
The threat of cyberwar, and the pervasiveness of cybercrime, require vigilance
and action by government and the private sector (which controls vast swaths of critical infrastructure). An armed conflict model of deterrence can provide a framework
for addressing certain types of cyber-threats from hostile nation-states that we might

42. See HEALEY, supra note 19.
43. See Bruce Schneier, Who Are the Shadow Brokers? What Is-And Isn’t—Known About the
Mysterious Hackers Leaking National Security Agency Secrets, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), https://
perma.cc/5DT7-RDN4.

338

JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 11:327

think of as falling into the “war” category. It does little, however, to address the dangers posed by cybercrime. Currently, private sector incentives to invest in cybersecurity include the reputational costs associated with breaches; business losses
associated with impaired functionality; and potential regulatory and tort liability.44
The law enforcement infrastructure required to support these efforts has not kept
pace with the scale of the threat or the degree of danger it poses.
The conceptual and doctrinal framework used to differentiate between “armed
attacks” that give rise to the right of self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51 and
all other types of conduct is notoriously difficult to apply in the cyber context.45
Moreover, even if relevant actors agree on whether the result of a particular cyber
operation is the functional equivalent of a kinetic “attack” for Article 51 purposes,
delays and ambiguity in attribution further complicate the picture. Although engaging in debates about the appropriate “control” test for attribution remain beyond the
scope of this article, attributing MCA—and substantiating that attribution without
revealing sources and methods—can impede efforts to expose and punish individual
wrongdoers and the states that may direct or support them.46
While individuals may bear criminal responsibility under both international
and domestic law, state responsibility has generally been understood as non-criminal in nature.47 A state might owe a duty of cessation, restitution, reparation, or
satisfaction, but states are not generally subject to penal sanctions. Individuals,
on the other hand, can and do bear individual criminal responsibility for violations of both domestic and international criminal law—often, even when they
were acting at the direction, or on behalf, of a foreign state. States are beginning
to navigate the difficult terrain of imposing criminal penalties on individuals for
carrying out state policy—something that the doctrine of foreign official
44. See, e.g., Nathaniel Sobol, The SEC and Cybersecurity Regulation, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://perma.cc/H9YB-87GP; Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure) Things:
Should Manufacturers Be Liable for Damage Caused by Hacked Devices?, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
913 (2017); Robert L. Rabin, Perspectives on Privacy, Data Security, and Tort Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV.
313 (2017); but cf. Stewart Baker, Why Tort Liability for Data Breaches Won’t Improve Cybersecurity,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/M2WD-B2PP (noting that “the actual damages
from data breaches are pretty modest in dollar terms, and the pattern of losses makes it very hard to
sustain a single class, something that forces up the cost of litigation for the plaintiffs”).
45. See, e.g., Kubo Mačák, Scenario 13: Cyber Operations as a Trigger of the Law of Armed Conflict,
CYBER LAW TOOLKIT, https://perma.cc/UA4F-Q57K (last edited Jan. 14, 2020). On the question of
identifying the threshold for an international or a non-international armed conflict, see Laurie R. Blank &
Benjamin R. Farley, Identifying the Start of Conflict: Conflict Recognition, Operational Realities and
Accountability in the Post-9/11 World, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 467, 478-87 (2015). This question also has
implications for the cyber insurance market, as illustrated by the Mondelez case involving whether a policy’s
exemption for “hostile or warlike” actions covers damage from the NotPetya virus. See Brian Corcoran,
What Mondelez v. Zurich May Reveal About Cyber Insurance in the Age of Digital Conflict, LAWFARE (Mar.
8, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/7XNS-BLH6.
46. On attribution generally, see, e.g., Kristen E. Boon, Are Control Tests Fit for the Future? The
Problem in Attribution Doctrines, 15 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).
47. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Categorizing Acts by State Officials: Attribution and Responsibility
in the Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 26 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 451, 461 (2016) (noting that state
responsibility in international law has traditionally been understood as the functional equivalent of
“liability” in municipal law).
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immunity has traditionally sought to avoid. Just as targeted sanctions attempt to
influence state behavior by pressuring individual foreign officials, so too does the
threat of prosecution aim to dis-incentivize individuals from engaging in MCA,
even on behalf of foreign states. The traditional distinction between “official” or
“public” acts, on the one hand, and “private” acts (such as those taken for personal benefit or financial gain), on the other, has already come under pressure with
the increasing recognition of the need to prosecute and punish international
crimes. The widespread phenomenon of state-sponsored cybercrime promises to
further challenge, and perhaps erode, this distinction, at least in certain contexts.
IV. TOWARDS A GLOBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MODEL
Given the difficulty in achieving international consensus and cooperation, the
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (CETS No. 185) remains the only binding
international instrument on cybercrime. It serves as a guideline for countries
developing national legislation against cybercrime, and it seeks to provide a
framework for international cooperation between states parties to the treaty. The
Cybercrime Convention Committee meets twice per year in an effort to facilitate
the effective use and implementation of the Convention, and to consider future
amendments.48 However, the Convention’s reach is far from global, and does not
include China or Russia. In addition, problems persist in securing agreement on
provisions that would facilitate investigations, prosecutions, and extraditions
without impinging unduly on privacy and human rights. Alexander Seger,
Executive Secretary of the Cybercrime Convention Committee, has written:
With cyberspace considered the “fifth domain of warfare” considerable resources are allocated by States to defensive and offensive military capabilities and
information operations, with the obvious risk of a further militarisation of
cyberspace. Criminal justice obviously offers a higher level of protection of
the rights of individuals than national security or defence solutions. However,
the very need to protect the rights of individuals and to meet data protection
and other rule of law requirements may very well lead to a dilemma: if criminal justice authorities are no longer able to investigate cybercrime and secure
electronic evidence in an effective manner, competencies and resources may
further shift to national security and intelligence bodies without the same level
of safeguards.49

Despite these challenges, domestic law prohibitions on unauthorized cyber activity are relatively well-established. Building the capacity to enforce these
48. See T-CY Plenaries, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://perma.cc/L9CE-8XQ5.
49. Alexander Seger, Enhanced Cooperation on Cybercrime: A Case for a Protocol to the Budapest
Convention, ITALIAN INST. FOR INT’L POL. STUD. (July 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/94V3-Y6WB. For
concerns about the recent passage of a Russia-sponsored U.N. resolution on cybercrime that threatens an
“open, free, and secure model of the internet,” see Joyce Hakmeh & Allison Peters, A New UN
Cybercrime Treaty? The Way Forward for Supporters of an Open, Free, and Secure Internet, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/MD9T-WF7H.
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prohibitions requires adequate resources and training at the domestic level, as
well as multinational cooperation in evidence-gathering and, potentially, apprehension of suspects when MCA crosses borders, as it regularly does.
A recent Council on Foreign Relations report underscores the importance of
capacity-building under a law enforcement framework, noting:
A common misperception is that the principal cybersecurity threats demanding
urgent international collaboration are massive, state sponsored attacks that target critical infrastructure such as power plants or electrical grids, causing massive devastation and human casualties. In fact, cyber threats are more diverse
and complex, often targeting private enterprises and endangering the technical
integrity of the digital world. The near-total digitization of business models
makes the global economy more vulnerable to cyberattacks, not only from
states but also from criminal organizations and other nonstate actors.50

The engagement of intergovernmental organizations such as Interpol,51 the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,52 the International Telecommunications
Union,53 and the Council of Europe54 in coordination and capacity-building efforts
remains critical in expanding domestic capabilities, with due regard for human
rights concerns.55 Nongovernmental organizations, such as the Global Cyber
Alliance, also have an important role to play.56
The technical and logistical difficulties of deterring garden-variety cybercrime
should not be underestimated, but this is a reason to devote more—not fewer—
resources to the effort. Joshua Tromp has described the challenge of deterring
cyberattacks in the following colorful terms:

50. Council on Foreign Relations, Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and
Adapting Cyber Norms (Feb. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/R6W3-V4HR.
51. INTERPOL, CYBERCRIME, https://perma.cc/9PKT-LHWT.
52. CYBERCRIME, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://perma.cc/39PB-YL8N; see also
UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON CYBERCRIME (Feb. 2013),
https://perma.cc/PPL9-D3Z8.
53. ITU-D Cybersecurity, INT’L TELECOMMS. UNION, https://perma.cc/F8KY-SFZV.
54. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ACTION AGAINST CYBERCRIME, https://perma.cc/R4YJ-JCUW.
55. See, e.g., Myrian Dunn Cavelty & Camino Kavanagh, Cybersecurity and Human Rights, in BEN
WAGNER, MATTHIAS C. KETTEMANN & KILLAN VIETH (eds.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, ch. 5 (2019) (exploring the relationship between cybersecurity and human
rights); Ronald J. Deibert, Towards a Human-Centric Approach to Cybersecurity, 32 ETHICS & INT’L
AFF. 411 (2018) (advocating for an approach to cybersecurity that prioritizes the individual rather than
the state, including by creating multiple forms of independent oversight and review); Andrew N.
Liaropoulos, Reconceptualising Cyber Security: Safeguarding Human Rights in the Era of Cyber
Surveillance, 6 INT’L J. OF CYBER WARFARE & TERRORISM 33 (2016) (arguing that the dominance of
war metaphors in cyber security discourse has failed to address the needs of people). For interventions
from civil society groups, see, e.g., How Law Enforcement Can Access Data Across Borders—Without
Crushing Human Rights, IFEX (July 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/2HYW-2X8F; Mapping Cybercrime
Laws and Violations of Digital Rights in Gulf and Neighboring Countries, GULF CENTRE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS (June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/L3HZ-DWWZ; Anja Kovacs & Dixie Hawtin, Cyber Security,
Cyber Surveillance and Online Human Rights (May 2013), https://perma.cc/UN9W-SJ7W.
56. GLOBAL CYBER ALLIANCE, MISSION & PURPOSE, https://perma.cc/7CTN-KZK9.
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Comparing cyber-attacks to the analogy of a child stealing cookies from a
cookie jar, the current environment is one where a child knows he should go
ahead and steal the cookie. The child’s parents are unable to determine who
took the cookie or in many cases to even notice a cookie is missing. And the
parents are severely limited in enacting any significant punishment for taking
the cookie. For the child, the benefits are great and the costs are low.57

Although Tromp argues for clearer deterrent options under an armed conflict
model, the “deterrence by punishment” approach under a law enforcement model
also has much to commend it. In both cases, a core problem today is the lack of
certainty that punishment will ensue—to the contrary, the likelihood of detection
of malfeasance and follow-through by authorities is vanishingly small.58
Duncan Hollis suggested in 2011 that features endemic to MCA make it futile
to rely on strategies of deterrence by proscription and punishment. In his view,
“[i]f cyberattackers assume that they cannot be identified (let alone sanctioned),
rules prohibiting cyberattacks and exploits will have little deterrent effect.”59 Eric
Jensen, by contrast, has characterized deterrence via the imposition of criminal or
civil penalties as a form of “legal strike back.”60 As Jensen emphasizes, however,
“legal strike back can only be an effective means of deterrence when states work
together with the common goal of suppressing malicious cyber activity.”61 For
this reason, a law enforcement model of deterrence must also involve an emphasis on diplomatic efforts to prioritize and to incentivize international cooperation.
In addition to problems of insufficient capacity, coordination, and consensus, a
complication also arises from the fact that some highly-publicized MCA appears
to be carried out by individuals at the direction, and/or with the tacit support, of
the very states that are charged with suppressing and punishing MCA. Any steps
that the United States takes to punish individuals involved in these efforts, or to
hold states responsible for failure to suppress MCA emanating from their territory, will raise questions of the degree to which the United States is willing to
subject itself, and its personnel, to similar enforcement efforts undertaken by
other states. This is one of the many reasons that cooperative approaches, where
possible, are likely to yield more sustainable results than unilateral measures.
Moreover, the potentially sensitive diplomatic issues raised by these high-profile
cases should not detract from efforts to combat the large swath of MCA that is
not sponsored or directed by states, as illustrated by the figure below.
57. Joshua Tromp, Law of Armed Conflict, Attribution, and the Challenges of Deterring CyberAttacks, SMALL WARS J. (2016), https://perma.cc/5DXC-XRMP.
58. Although empirical research on deterrence faces numerous methodological challenges,
criminologists have concluded in a number of studies that declining crime rates are associated with an
increased likelihood (certainty) of apprehension and punishment. See Five Things About Deterrence,
NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (June 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/55TW-33WC; see also Kelli D. Tomlinson, An
Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?, 80 FED. PROBATION 33 (Dec. 2016), https://
perma.cc/Q38B-W7DV.
59. Duncan Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L. J. 373, 378 (2011).
60. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 773, 800 (2012).
61. Id. at 806.
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Fig. 2
Disaggregating Threats & Responses: A War/Crime Continuum
Actor / Degree of
Connection to Foreign
Government

Foreign government cyber
actors (military or nonmilitary chain of command)
(“state-executed” MCA)

Inflicting “kinetic”
effects on critical
infrastructure

Primary Objective
Geopolitical goals
Geopolitical goals
with focus on
with focus on
disrupting
stealing from and/or
governmental
disrupting private
functions
sector activities

Private
financial
gain

WAR

Foreign government forces
and/or non-government actors
that are de facto state agents
(“state-integrated” or “stateordered” MCA)
Foreign non-government
actors encouraged or
supported by foreign
government (“stateencouraged,” “state-shaped,”
or “state-coordinated” MCA)

CRIME

Foreign non-government
actors deliberately ignored by
permissive or tacitly
supportive foreign government
(“state-ignored” MCA)
Foreign government cyber
forces acting ultra vires, or
foreign non-government actors
engaging successfully in
prohibited conduct (“stateprohibited-but-inadequate” or
“state-rogue-conducted”
MCA)
Domestic non-government
actors

By disaggregating and differentiating among different types of MCA, including by their provenance, goals, and (where ascertainable) motivations, we can
move towards a more comprehensive and coordinated response to this ever-growing problem.

